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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE WARRANTLESS SEIZURE AND SEARCH OF MEHEW'S
VEHICLE WAS NOT JUSTIFIED UNDER THE AUTOMOBILE
EXCEPTION AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE I,
SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION ARE CONGRUENT IN
THIS RESULT
The State cites a string of cases from the United States Supreme Court to support
its position that when an automobile is involved, no matter what the circumstances, a
search warrant is never required to search the automobile as long as probable cause
exists and there is a mere possibility that the car will be moved. Federal and State case
law does not support the state's position in this case.
The United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court have applied the
automobile exception to the search warrant doctrine in situations where there was
justification for a police stop. Moreover, both courts have applied the automobile
exception almost exclusively in cases where the police stopped the vehicle for a traffic
violation and then obtained probable cause to search, or where the police observed a
vehicle being used in the process of drug transactions. In both situations, the vehicles
were "readily mobile," because people were driving the vehicle at the time of the stop
or the defendant just got out of the vehicle and probable cause existed for criminal
behavior. In all situations, the fact that the vehicles were "readily mobile" justified the
officers' search without a warrant because there was not time to obtain a search
warrant; or rather the fact that the vehicle was readily mobile was the exigency itself.

In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280 (1925), government
agents observed the defendants transporting alcohol in their car and stopped and
searched the car without a warrant. Id. at 160-61. The United States Supreme Court
reasoned that an exception to the Fourth Amendment's requirement to obtain a search
warrant was justified because "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought." Id. at 153.
In California v. Carney, All U.S. 386, 105 S.Ct. 2066 (1985), officers viewed
young boys enter and leave the defendant's vehicle, then stopped and questioned one of
the individuals, and were told that the defendant was exchanging sexual favors for
marijuana. Id. at 388. The officers then searched the vehicle without a warrant. Id.
The Court found that defendant's motor home fit within the automobile exception
because of its capacity to be "quickly moved." Id. at 392-93. The Court noted that
reduced expectation of privacy was also a factor to consider under the automobile
exception, and emphasized that "the capacity to be 'quickly moved' was clearly the
basis of the holding in Carroll, and our cases have consistently recognized ready
mobility as one of the principal bases of the automobile exception." Id. at 390; See,
e.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59, 87 S.Ct. 788, 789 (1967); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1981 (1970); Cady v. Dombrowske, 413
U.S. 433, 442, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528 (1973); Cardwell v. Lewis, All U.S. 583, 588, 94
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S.Ct. 2464, 2468 (1974); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367, 96 S.Ct.
3092, 3096 (1976).
In Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 119 S.Ct. 2013 (1999) (per curiam),
police received information from a confidential informant that the defendant, a known
drug dealer, would be driving a red Toyota, license number DDY 787, with a
substantial amount of cocaine. Id. The police investigated the tip and corroborated the
information, then stopped and searched the vehicle and found drugs in the defendant's
vehicle. Id. at 466. The Court found sufficient probable cause for the stop and search,
and that a warrant was not necessary under the automobile exception because the car
was readily mobile. Id. at 467. In doing so, the Court relied on Pennsylvania v.
Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 116 S.Ct. 2485 (1996) (per curiam).
In Labron, the Supreme Court, in another per curiam decision, resolved two
cases under the automobile exception doctrine. In the first case, police observed
Labron and others engaging in a series of drug transactions from a vehicle, then
arrested the suspects and searched the vehicle from which the drugs had been produced
and found bags containing cocaine. 518 U.S. at 939. The second case involved police
observing an undercover informant agreeing to buy drugs from Kilgore in a parking lot,
then driving back to the defendant's farmhouse where the undercover informant
obtained the drugs. Id. After the drugs were delivered, the police searched the
farmhouse with the consent of the owner and also searched Kilgore's truck, which was

parked in the driveway of the farmhouse. Id. During the drug transaction, the police
observed the defendants "walking to and from the truck." Id.
The United States Supreme Court upheld both of these searches under the
automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The Court in
Labron found that this exception was "based on the automobile's 'ready mobility,' an
exigency sufficient to excuse failure to obtain a search warrant once probable cause to
conduct the search is clear." Id. at 940 (see Carney, All U.S. at 390-91).
In State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996), officers pulled over the
defendant, known for carrying weapons, after receiving reports of drug trafficking, and
searched his vehicle for drugs and other contraband without a warrant. Id. at 1230-31.
The Utah Supreme Court cited Carroll and California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S 565, 111
S.Ct. 1982, (1991) (probable cause and exigent circumstances required as a
precondition to a valid warrantless search of an automobile), and found that the
automobile exception applied. Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1236-37'.
In cases where the United States Supreme Court and Utah Courts have applied
the automobile exception due to the mobility of the vehicle, the officers did not have
time to obtain a search warrant because the officers either made a justified stop of the
vehicle or observed suspicious transactions related to the vehicle without sufficient time
to obtain a search warrant after obtaining probable cause. Thus, it is apparent that
although the Supreme Court states, "if a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists
to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment... permits police to search the
4

vehicle without more" Dyson, 527 U.S. at 467, the Court has not held that a search of
an automobile without a warrant is justified under any circumstance as long as there is
probable cause to support the search and the vehicle is readily mobile. And in Labron,
the Court made clear that a vehicle's ready mobility was in fact the exigency that
allowed a search without a warrant. See Labron, 518 U.S. at 940.
The present case is unlike any case the United States Supreme Court or Utah
Courts have applied the automobile exception to. In Carroll, Dyson, Labron, and
Anderson, where officers justifiably "stopped" each of the defendants in their vehicles
and conducted a search without a warrant, the Court's justified each search on the
reason that the officer would not have time to obtain before a search warrant before
possible evidence could be destroyed due to the mobility of the vehicles. And in
Carney and the second case the United States Supreme Court considered in Labron, the
officers were justified in searching the vehicles because they personally observed
criminal activity related to the vehicles and did not have time to obtain a search warrant
before possible evidence could be destroyed due to the mobility of the vehicles.
In the present case, Mehew was not "stopped" in her vehicle due to a traffic
violation or other suspicious behavior related to her vehicle. In fact, the vehicle was
parked in the driveway of her residence in the middle of the night and Mehew had
already been interrogated and arrested (R. 142: 28-29). Instead, Officer Bean was
notified by the Orem police that Mehew's vehicle was at the residence (R. 143: 10-11).
With this information, there was sufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant

from a neutral magistrate without alerting Mehew or anyone else of the investigation.
Instead, Officer Bean went to Mehew's residence in the middle of the night, woke
Mehew, questioned her and eventually arrested her (R. 143: 11-15).
Before this point in time, there was no threat or danger that any evidence of an
alleged crime would be destroyed. The alleged criminal activity involved was not
easily disposable drugs; it was an installed stereo system in a previously identified
vehicle. There was absolutely no danger that evidence would be lost before obtaining a
search warrant. If any danger ever arose that evidence might be destroyed, it was due
to the officer's actions of waking Mehew's family after midnight. Thus, the officer
created the exigency if one existed at all.
And as seen above, although the United States Supreme Court as of late has
stated that probable cause and a mobile automobile is sufficient to justify a warrantless
search of an automobile, the circumstances surrounding the stop of the automobile and
the mobility of the automobile is the exigency that allows for the warrantless search.
See Labron, 518 U.S. at 940.
Therefore, this case is readily distinguishable from the cases cited by the State
that the United States Supreme Court and Utah Courts have applied the automobile
exception to. There was no danger of evidence being destroyed or crossing jurisdiction
lines, and if any exigency existed, it was caused by the officers' actions. For the stated
reasons above, Mehew relies on her prior brief to support her claim of the police
manufactured exigency.
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This issue is not insignificant. Under the State's view, any automobile, any
time, anywhere is subject to an intrusive search as long as probable cause exists that
contraband will be found therein, and as long as the automobile is capable of being
moved. Mehew asserts that this reasoning is unacceptable on constitutional grounds.
The State's argument supports the view that police officers have the outright authority
to search any automobile, regardless of other important circumstances, without a search
warrant so long as the officer believes probable cause exists that contraband will be
found in the automobile and that it is possible that the automobile can be moved. Such
a standard gives unfettered discretion to officers to search any vehicle whenever they
want. Of course the probable cause determination is reviewable by courts, but this
provides little protection to the untold numbers of people that will have their
constitutional rights violated by over-zealous officers.
Neither the Fourth Amendment nor Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution
affords the government such a sweeping grant of authority. The search and seizure in
the present case was not justified and this Court should correct the trial court's legal
conclusion that the warrantless search and seizure of Mehew's was justifiable.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in the original brief, Mehew
asks this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of her motions to suppress. Mehew
further asks that this matter be remanded to the Fourth District Court with instruction

that her pleas are to be withdrawn, that all the evidence obtained as a result of the
warrantless search and seizure is to be suppressed, and that this matter is to be
dismissed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j 5 _ day of March, 2003.

Margaret P/ Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
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